_Zettel, _ an en face bilingual edition, collects fragments from Wittgenstein's work between 1929 and 1948 on issues of the mind, mathematics, and language.

_Zettel, _ an en face bilingual edition, collects fragments from Wittgenstein's work between 1929 and 1948 on issues of the mind, mathematics, and language.

This considerably revised second edition of Wittgenstein's 1914-16 notebooks contains a new appendix with photographs of Wittgenstein's original work, a new preface by Elizabeth Anscombe, and a useful index by E.D. Klemke. Corrections have been made throughout the text, and notes have been added, making this the definitive edition of the notebooks. The writings intersperse Wittgenstein's technical logical notations with his thoughts on the meaning of life, happiness, and death. "When the first edition of this collection of remarks appeared in (...) 1961 we were provided with a glimpse of the workings of Wittgenstein's mind during the period when the seminal ideas of the _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_ were being worked out. This second edition provided the occasion to be struck anew by the breadth, rigor, and above all the restlessness of that mind."—T. Michael McNulty, S. J., _The Modern Schoolman_. (shrink)

Zettel is a collection of fragments which Wittgenstein cut from various of his typescripts and preserved for future use. More than half of the fragments were written in the years 1946-1948, after the completion of Part I and before the composition of Part II of the Philosophical Investigations. This collection may therefore be regarded as a companion volume to the Investigations, adding to both the scope and the Unity of Wittgenstein′s chef d′oeuvre. The fragments were kept in a box and (...) were not strictly ordered. Many have marks showing changes and improvements made after they were cut from the typescripts; some have remarks added in handwriting. Editing the collection for publication was thus a task of considerable difficulty. Since Zettel was first published, further research has been carried out on the fragments and minute comparisons have been made with their typescript and manuscript sources, revealing certain inaccuracies and misinterpretations in the first editing of the work. The second edition corrects these shortcomings and includes new explanatory footnotes; a detailed index, compiled by Stephen Amdur, has also been added. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's work remains, undeniably, now, that off one of those few philosophers who will be read by all future generations.

This bilingual edition of the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology presents the first English translation of an essential body of Wittgenstein's work. It elaborates Wittgenstein's views on psychological concepts such as expectation, sensation, knowing how to follow a rule, and knowledge of the sensations of other persons. It also shows strong emphasis on the "anthropological" aspect of Wittgenstein's thought.

Parallel dual language text (German and English).

Written over the last 18 months of his life and inspired by his interest in G. E. Moore's defence of common sense, this much discussed volume collects Wittgenstein's reflections on knowledge and certainty, on what it is to know a proposition for sure.

The National Library of Finland and the Von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Helsinki keep the collected correspondence of Georg Henrik von Wright, Wittgenstein’s friend and successor at Cambridge and one of the three literary executors of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. Among von Wright’s correspondence partners, Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees are of special interest to Wittgenstein scholars as the two other trustees of the Wittgenstein papers. Thus, von Wright’s collections held in Finland promise to (...) shed light on the context of decades of editorial work that made Wittgenstein’s later philosophy available to all interested readers. In this text, we present the letters which von Wright received from Anscombe and Rhees during the first nine months after Wittgenstein’s death. This correspondence provides a vivid picture of the literary executors as persons and of their developing relationships. The presented letters are beautiful examples of what the correspondence as a whole has to offer; it depicts – besides facts of editing – the story of three philosophers, whose conversing voices unfold the human aspects of inheriting Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. Their story does not only deal with editing the papers of an eminent philosopher, but with the attempt to do justice to the man they knew, to his philosophy and to his wishes for publication. (shrink)

RésuméCette étude retrace l'évolution des recherches de von Wright en logique déontique depuis 1951 jusqu'à la fin des années 70. J'ai préféré, à une suite d'exposés isolés et indépendants à propos de chaque système, m'attacher à la mise en évidence des différences et des similitudes; je montre en quoi chaque étape est originale. Je reléve d'abord les traits saillants du système de 1951 et ceux de la construction de 1963, après avoir analysé les raisons du passage du premier à (...) la seconde. Ensuite, j'expose le profil essentiel de la généralisation métalogique de 1968. Enfin, je décris les tentatives de réduction de la logique déontique à des logiques plus familieres et j'examine à propos de positions très recentes ce qui va dans le sens de la reprise de l'ancien et ce qui marque des ruptures radicales avec tout ce qui précéde.SummaryThis study describes the evolution of von Wright's investigations about deontic logic from 1951 until the late 70. Rather than isolated expositions of a series of independent systems, I prefered to attach myself to differences and similitudes. I strived to show the originality of each conception. First, I call attention to the 1951 system principal features; I analyse the reasons which compelled von Wright to construct the 1963 logico‐philosophical system. Then I describe the essential profile of the 1968 metalogic generalisation. So, I come to the reductionnist tentations, concluding with the examination of very recent positions. In the conceptions of the late 70, we find a lot of things which repeat the past, but also extreme originality on many points. (shrink)

This article revisits G.H. von Wright’s 1963 proposal of a ‘broad approach to ethics’ and his idea that moral goodness is a non-autonomous form of goodness ‘in search of a meaning’. In von Wright’s view, moral notions are to be examined in a broad framework consisting of various groups of ethically relevant concepts. This framework is described and some connections to Elizabeth Anscombe’s work in the late 1950s are identified. It is argued that von Wright’s broadly construed (...) ethics provides tools for understanding contextual and temporal variation of ‘moral points of view’ and puts traditional ideas concerning the nature of moral philosophy in a new light. However, von Wright failed to draw all the consequences of his own suggestions: accordingly, it is suggested that we have to abandon his view of a philosopher as a ‘moulder’ of concepts for a more context-oriented and elucidative conception of moral philosophy. (shrink)

Donald Davidson established causalism, i.e. the view that reasons are causes and that action explanation is causal explanation, as the dominant view within contemporary action theory. According to his “master argument”, we must distinguish between reasons the agent merely has and reasons she has and which actually explain what she did, and the only, or at any rate the best, way to make the distinction is by saying that the reasons for which an agent acts are causes of her action. (...) “Davidson's challenge” to non‐causalists is to come up with an alternative, more convincing, way of drawing the distinction. In this paper, I argue that G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright offer such an alternative. Moreover, I argue that Davidson's own account of interpretation makes no use of his causalist claim. (shrink)

I discuss the treatment by Chisholm of the problem posed by the fact that one can produce some neuro-physiological changes by moving a limb, namely the ones which cause the motions. I concentrate largely on the treatment Chisholm gave to this question before Person and Object, and I compare it with von Wright's discussion of it, I conclude that there are correct elements about both but that both are unsatisfactory, Chisholm's because it entails that we must know something which (...) we manifestly need not know when we move. (shrink)

I discuss the treatment by Chisholm of the problem posed by the fact that one can produce some neuro-physiological changes by moving a limb, namely the ones which cause the motions. I concentrate largely on the treatment Chisholm gave to this question before Person and Object, and I compare it with von Wright's discussion of it, I conclude that there are correct elements about both but that both are unsatisfactory, Chisholm's because it entails that we must know something which (...) we manifestly need not know when we move. (shrink)

I discuss the treatment by Chisholm of the problem posed by the fact that one can produce some neuro-physiological changes by moving a limb, namely the ones which cause the motions. I concentrate largely on the treatment Chisholm gave to this question before Person and Object, and I compare it with von Wright's discussion of it, I conclude that there are correct elements about both but that both are unsatisfactory, Chisholm's because it entails that we must know something which (...) we manifestly need not know when we move. (shrink)

Two jarring results concerning the main theses of Georg Henrik von Wright's Explanation and Understanding are reached through an examination and criticism of his project. It is shown, contrary to his settled judgment both in EU and subsequently, that the schema of practical inference is a causal principle, and that it is nomological in character. But one feature of von Wright's overall analysis holds up and continues to show promise: his idea of understanding explanation. This idea combines the (...) EU account of the schema and its instantiation with the notion of an intelligible connection of these instantiating elements with one another. Here the schema is deployed in conjunction with the test of intelligible connection as one of its conditions of application. The schema, so deployed, is revisable on the basis of experiences that do not conform to what we expect them to be when they are regimented in accordance with the model of understanding explanation; thus, even though the schema is not a general law, we have a basis for characterizing it as nomological, nonetheless. (shrink)